A quarter century of inflation targeting in Latin America: Progress, challenges, and the road ahead
Originally published by Caribbean News Global Read the original
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- IMF Deputy Managing Director Nigel Clarke’s Opening Remarks at the IMF-Brazil Central Bank Conference, November 18, 2026, Brasília, Brazil
The theme of this conference, the progress, challenges, and the future of inflation targeting in Latin America, could not be more timely. The post-pandemic period brought the sharpest synchronised inflation surge in a generation, compounded by supply disruptions and geopolitical tensions. Latin America’s central banks were ahead of the curve, tightening early and decisively, well before most advanced economies, to bring inflation back down. The Central Bank of Brazil, for example, raised its policy rates from 2 percent in March 2021 to 13.75 percent in August 2022. This swift response helped preserve credibility built over decades: long-term inflation expectations remained relatively well anchored, a testament to strong institutions and timely policy action.
For many countries, the task is to complete that last mile – often the hardest – of returning inflation to target. In that effort, policymakers are navigating two powerful forces pulling global growth in opposite directions. Pulling growth down is the energy shock, a negative global supply shock that affects growth and increases uncertainty. Pulling up is the AI investment boom, a positive demand shock that stimulates investment, trade, growth, and of course, financial market valuations. Different as they are, these forces share one important feature: both add to inflationary pressures, complicating the path back to price stability.
And these global forces are only one part of the challenges policymakers face. They must also contend with rising food prices amid intensifying climate-related shocks, including El Niño, and high and rising public debt.
In this complex environment, what do we do?
As we reflect on the lessons of the past twenty-five years and look to the future, let me suggest three questions to guide our discussion here.
First, how can we preserve and build on the credibility earned over the past quarter century?
Inflation targeting rests on a simple foundation: credibility. The framework is only as strong as the expectations it can anchor. When expectations hold firm, shocks pass; when they drift, inflation becomes entrenched and costly to reverse. But how is that credibility earned and sustained? Our host country offers a powerful illustration.
Brazil adopted formal inflation targeting in June 1999, after the abandoning its exchange rate peg. The memory of previous decades of runaway inflation was still very fresh. Before the Real Plan took effect in 1994, inflation was above 1 000 percent.
Credibility did not come overnight. The inflation target was reinforced by a floating exchange rate, better fiscal discipline, greater central bank transparency and communication, and ample reserve buffers. More recently, the central bank acquired operational autonomy and adopted a continuous target of 3 percent. Together, these elements turned the target into a durable nominal anchor and strengthened monetary policy’s capacity to respond to shocks.
Brazil was not alone. Across Latin America, countries have adopted inflation targeting, strengthened central bank institutions, clarified policy objectives and improved communication. But credibility is hard to earn and easy to lose. How to preserve and build on this credibility as new shocks keep coming is a question I hope this conference will help answer.
Second, how can monetary and fiscal policy work better together?
Monetary and fiscal policy have distinct mandates, and each is decided through its own institutional process. Yet their interaction is becoming increasingly important.
High and rising public debt is intensifying the interaction between interest rates and fiscal policy around the world. When debt is already elevated, rising monetary policy rates can significantly increase debt-servicing costs and put additional pressure on public finances. Conversely, high debt also makes market interest rates more sensitive to fiscal developments.
Monetary and fiscal policy can play a complementary role in supporting macroeconomic stability while respecting their distinctive mandates. Credible fiscal adjustment eases inflationary and exchange rate pressures, lowers risk premium, and helps anchor inflation expectations. In turn, credible monetary policy helps contain financing costs and provides a more stable environment for the economy and fiscal decisions.
Here, I can speak from my own experience as Jamaica’s minister of finance.
For four decades, from 1973, Jamaica’s macroeconomic story was characterised, among other things, by fiscal unsustainability and price instability. Governments ran deficits in 34 of those 40 years, and inflation sat in double digits for almost half of them. Debt climbed to unsustainable levels, and fiscal dominance followed: monetary policy was effectively held hostage by the needs of the budget, with the central bank forced to help finance the deficit, making it much harder to control prices. With the central bank lacking independence, the repeated shocks of the 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s spilled over into broader and more persistent price increases.
That changed when Jamaica began an ambitious fiscal adjustment, backed by reforms designed to restore debt sustainability and lock it in. The reform efforts brought general government gross debt down from about 135 percent of GDP in 2013 to about 62 percent at the end of 2024. As the fiscal position strengthened and the exchange rate became more flexible, the central bank gained the room it needed to bring interest rates down, and it did.
In 2020, Jamaica passed legislation establishing the Bank’s independence. The law made price stability its primary mandate and strengthened both its governance and its capital base. The first test came soon after. As the world emerged from COVID-19, inflation rose from 3.8 per cent in April 2021, broke through the top of the target range in August of that year, and peaked at 11.8 per cent in April 2022. The bank started tightening in October 2021, raising its policy rate from 0.5 percent to 7.0 percent by November 2022. By October 2023, inflation was firmly back within the target range. The hard-won credibility had proved its value: with expectations relatively well anchored, the Bank was able to bring inflation down without the economic downturn some would have feared.
For a generation used to decade-long bouts of high inflation, it felt like magic. Never before in living memory had inflation responded so cleanly, so exactly as the textbook says it should, to monetary policy. Of course, the central bank didn’t do it alone. Sustainable fiscal policy enabled this achievement.
Fiscal adjustment is rarely easy, and lasting reform needs broad ownership. In Jamaica, we tabled the initial Bill in 2018 and sent it to a special committee of government and opposition members which I chaired as finance minister. Over the following two years, government members sitting with opposition members, in full view of the televised and YouTube public, reviewed its contents, clause by clause, revising and updating the Bill until we achieved consensus. As a result of this intentional consultation process, the Bill was owned by the government and the opposition, We then reinforced those gains by creating an Independent Fiscal Commission to act as guardian of the fiscal rules. But high public debt can still pressure central banks to keep interest rates low. How do we make the two policies work together while safeguarding central bank independence? That question is especially important today and deserves an honest debate.
The third question looks ahead: how should inflation targeting evolve in an age of more frequent shocks?
We now live in a world where shocks come more often and hit harder. Think of the past seven years. A pandemic that upended global supply chains. Wars in Ukraine and the Middle East that sent energy and commodity prices soaring. And sweeping changes in trade barriers and trading relationships. Any one of these events alone would have been considered exceptional. Experiencing all of them within such a short period has been extraordinary.
The forces shaping this environment are not going away: geopolitical fragmentation, the AI revolution, extreme weather, and volatile capital flows. The global economy has proved resilient, but that resilience is under strain. Many protective buffers are running thin, including inventories used to cushion fuel price increases.
In this environment, shocks can spread rapidly through prices, supply chains, and financial markets. They often push inflation and output in opposite directions. That makes central banks’ decisions harder—and the tradeoffs harder to explain to the public.
In a shock-prone world, central banks must strike a balance: look through temporary shocks without allowing them to lead to persistent inflation. That takes better tools to track expectations, a risk-based approach, and clear communication about difficult tradeoffs. It also takes central bank independence and credibility, and these matter most when supply shocks hit. Better-anchored inflation expectations limit the pass-through of energy and other commodity price shocks to consumer prices, allowing central banks to moderate their interest rate increases.
Over the next two days, I hope our distinguished speakers and audience will explore these three questions: how to sustain credibility, how monetary and fiscal policy can work better together, and how inflation targeting should adapt to more frequent shocks and prolonged uncertainty.
And there is no better place to do so than Brasília—a city built as a bold bet on the future, in a country whose inflation-targeting journey reflects many of the lessons we are here to discuss.
With that, I am delighted to welcome you all and invite my colleague, IMF executive director André Roncaglia, to begin our proceedings.